The Expanding Scope of Products Liability: New
Jersey Extends A Manufacturer's Responsibility
To Include Injuries Caused After A Substantial
Alteration of its Product
I. INTRODUCTION

New Jersey has long been in the forefront of states allowing
recovery under the theory of strict products liability.' During the
past twenty-five years, the state supreme court has provided injured plaintiffs with a variety of substantive and procedural weapons to wield against manufacturers who are often shielded by
complicated corporate structures and the commercial distribution chain itself.2 As a result, the balance of power has shifted.
Plaintiffs claiming that they were injured by an allegedly defective
product now possess an inordinate degree of influence over the
corporate decision-making process. 3 In two recent cases, Soler v.
Castmaster4 and Brown v. United States Stove Co. ,5 the New Jersey
Supreme Court missed an opportunity to halt this alarming
trend. Instead, the court once again expanded the scope of a
manufacturer's liability by holding that the maker of a machine
may be accountable for injuries that occur after the machine has

I See Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 66-67, 207 A.2d 305, 31213 (1965) (adopting theory of strict liability in tort for injuries caused by defective
products).
2 See, e.g., Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 240-41, 432 A.2d
925, 931 (1981) (theory of strict liability applies in cases of inadequate warning);
Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., 86 N.J. 332, 358, 431 A.2d 811, 825 (1981) (successor
corporation may be liable for defective products manufactured by predecessor);
Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 167-68, 406 A.2d 140, 148
(1979) (factory employee injured while operating machine cannot be contributorily
negligent); Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 173-74, 386 A.2d 816,
826-27 (1978) (existence of design defect determined by risk-utility standard);
Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 66-67, 207 A.2d 305,312-13 (1965)
(adopting theory of strict products liability); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 413, 161 A.2d 69, 99-100 (1960) (abolishing privity requirement).
But see O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 183, 463 A.2d 298, 305 (1983) (state
of the art relevant in determining existence of design defect). See generally Note,
State-of-the-Art Evidence Relevant to Risk- Utility Analysis in Design Defect Cases, 15 SETON
HALL L. REV. 120 (1984) (tracing development of products liability law in New
Jersey).
3 See, e.g., infra note 183; see also Sorry, Your Policy Is Canceled, TIME, Mar. 24,
1986, at 16, 18-19 (discussing per-unit cost of products liability insurance in industries such as aircraft manufacture, day-care centers, and hospital service).
4 98 N.J. 137, 484 A.2d 1225 (1984).
5 98 N.J. 155, 484 A.2d 1234 (1984).
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been substantially modified by a subsequent user.6
This comment will first provide a brief historical introduction to the law of products liability. 7 It will then analyze the Soler
and Brown cases in detail.8 Finally, the comment will explore
some of the ramifications of these decisions, including the possibility of a nationwide legislative response to the judicial expansion of strict products liability.9
II. BACKGROUND
Throughout the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth, the leading case in the field that eventually became known as
products liability' ° was Winterbottom v. Wright." In that case, the
court barred liability for breach of contract because of lack of
privity between the parties.' 2 In accordance with the broad language in that decision,' 3 subsequent courts held that privity was
essential to any claim based on injuries caused by a defective
product." 4 By the turn of the century, however, several courts
had formulated exceptions to this rule, primarily for imminently
dangerous products. 1' Then, in 1916, in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.

16

Justice Cardozo extended the exception for imminently

6 Soler, 98 N.J. at 151, 484 A.2d at 1232; Brown, 98 N.J. at 166, 484 A.2d at
1239.
7 See infra notes 10-39 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 40-163 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 164-203 and accompanying text.
10 The term "products liability" denotes the area of law that establishes the liability of manufacturers and sellers for injuries caused by their products to third
parties. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 98, at 693 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER &
KEETON].
11 152

Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. P. 1842). In the Winterbottom case, the driver of a mail
coach was injured when faulty repairs caused the coach to collapse. See id. at 403.
The defendant had contracted with the Postmaster General to perform maintenance on the latter's mail coaches. Id. at 402-03. The injured driver attempted to
impose liability on the defendant for his failure to keep the coaches in a safe condition. Id. at 403.
12 See id. at 405.
13 See id. Lord Abinger thought that to allow liability to third parties would lead
to "the most absurd and outrageous consequences." Id. He observed that if a
driver were allowed to sue the contractor regardless of privity, a "passenger, or
even any person passing along the road, who was injured by the upsetting of the
coach," might also do so. Id.
14 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 10, § 96, at 681 & n.4.
15 See Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865, 871 (8th Cir. 1903).
See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 10, § 96, at 682.
16 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). This landmark case held an automobile
manufacturer liable for injuries caused by a defective wheel it had negligently failed
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dangerous products to include any negligently manufactured
product.1 7 It was not until the 1960's, however, that liability was
imposed in the absence of privity or negligence, first on the basis
of breach of warranty 18 and then on the basis of strict liability in
tort. 19

The California Supreme Court, in the 1963 case of Greenman
v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. ,20 was the first to recognize the doctrine of strict products liability. In developing this doctrine,
courts since Greenman have had to struggle with a variety of issues, such as setting standards to define a defective condition,21
to inspect, even though the person injured was not in privity with the manufacturer.
See id. at 389-90, 111 N.E. at 1053.
17 See id. at 390, 394, 111 N.E. at 1053, 1054-55.
18 See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
Henningsen was the leading case in establishing breach of warranty as a basis for a
manufacturer's liability. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 10, § 97, at 690. Under
this theory, a third party could bring suit for injuries caused by a defective product,
regardless of negligence, if he was a foreseeable user of that product. See Henningsen, 32 N.J. at 413, 414-15, 161 A.2d at 99, 100. Earlier cases had permitted liability
for breach of warranty only to persons who were in privity to the contract. See, e.g.,
Berg v. Rapid Motor Vehicle Co., 78 N.J.L. 724, 75 A. 933 (1910).
19 Strict liability has long been an established principle in tort law. See, e.g., Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-H.L. 330 (1868). A defendant is strictly liable for harm
caused by an abnormally dangerous activity even though "he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 519(1)
(1965). The relatively recent application of this principle to the field of products
liability results in the imposition of liability on anyone who sells a defective product
that causes injury to the ultimate user or consumer, regardless of the degree of care
exercised by the seller. See id. § 402A. Section 402A provides as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer,
or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applied although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into a contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
20 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). In Greenman, the plaintiff was injured while using a defective power tool. See id. at 59, 377 P.2d at 898, 27
Cal. Rptr. at 698. Although the plaintiff sued on the theories of negligence and
breach of warranty, the California Supreme Court found the manufacturer liable by
applying the principles of strict liability. Id. at 62-63, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr.
at 700.
21 See, e.g., Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314, 326-27, 232 A.2d
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contributory negligence,2 2 and the effect of misuse or abuse of
the product on liability. 23 Recently, in Soler and its companion
case Brown, the Supreme Court of New Jersey24 addressed yet another important question: the impact that substantial alteration
of a product has on a manufacturer's liability.2 5
In New Jersey, as in other jurisdictons, it is well-established
that a manufacturer has a duty to place into the stream of commerce only products that are reasonably fit and safe for their intended or foreseeable purposes.2 6 Thus, in a strict products
liability action, a defect in design may be the basis for imposing
liability on a manufacturer.2 7 In New Jersey, the leading case of
Cepeda v. CumberlandEngineering Co. 2 8 established that such design
defects are measured by a risk-utility test. 29 This type of analysis
balances the product's usefulness against the risk that it will
879, 886 (Law Div. 1967) (a product is defective if it is "unreasonably dangerous to
the ultimate user or consumer"), rev'd, 53 NJ. 138, 249 A.2d 65 (1969).
22 See, e.g., Mohr v. B.F. Goodrich Rubber Co., 147 N.J. Super. 279, 285, 371
A.2d 288, 292 (App. Div.) (contributory negligence is a possible defense except
where manufacturer's due care could have prevented plaintiff's contributing activity), certif denied, 74 N.J. 281, 377 A.2d 685 (1977).
23 See, e.g., Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 177, 386 A.2d 816,
828 (1978) (foreseeable misuse of a product does not relieve the manufacturer of
liability).
24 The New Jersey Supreme Court has been a leader in formulating innovative
changes in tort law. See, e.g., supra note 18 and accompanying text; see also Kelly v.
Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984) (social host who negligently serves
liquor to intoxicated guest liable to injured party when guest causes auto accident).
25 See Soler, 98 NJ. at 141, 484 A.2d at 1227; Brown, 98 N.J. at 161, 484 A.2d at
1237.
26 Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 169, 406 A.2d 140,
149 (1979); see also Scanlon v. General Motors Corp., 65 N.J. 582, 591, 326 A.2d
673, 677 (1974) ("product is defective if it is not fit for the ordinary purposes for
which such articles are sold and used");Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg., 42
N.J.177, 182, 199 A.2d 826, 829 (1964) ("goods of which [plaintiff] complains
[must be] unreasonably dangerous for their intended use").
27 See, e.g., Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 394, 451 A.2d
179, 183 (1982); Santor v. A & M Karigheusian, Inc., 44 NJ. 52, 67, 207 A.2d 305,
313 (1965). In Michalko, the court set forth the elements for a prima facie design
defect case: "(1) the product design [must be] defective; (2) the defect [must exist]
when the product [is] under the control of [the manufacturer]; and (3) the defect
[must cause] injury to a reasonably foreseeable user." Michalko, 91 NJ. at 394, 451
A.2d at 183.
28 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978).
29 Id. at 173-74, 386 A.2d at 826-27. The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized seven factors suggested by Dean Wade to be considered in risk-utility
analysis:
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cause harm." In addition, before a design defect will result in
liability, the plaintiff must prove that the defect was the proximate cause of the injury.8 1 A failure to install safety equipment
33
on a product 3 2 or to give adequate warnings at the time of sale
can be considered the proximate cause of an injury, thus giving
rise to liability. Furthermore, the plaintiff must have been a foreseeable user of the product, and he must have been using it for
its intended purposes.3 4
One possible defense available to a manufacturer in a strict
products liability suit based on a design defect, implicit in section
402A(1)(b) of the Second Restatement of Torts, is substantial altera(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to
the user and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will
cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the
same need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of
the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive
to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the
use of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in
the product and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge
of the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable
warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading
the loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability
insurance.
Id. at 174, 386 A.2d at 826-27 (quoting Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for
Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973)).
30 See Wade, supra note 29, at 835. Only safe products are to be marketed.
Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 238 n.1, 432 A.2d 925, 930 n.l
(1981). Under the risk-utility standard, a product is considered safe when its utility
outweighs its risk. See Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 394,
451 A.2d 179, 183 (1982); Freund, 87 N.J. at 238 n.l, 432 A.2d at 930 n.l. One
important qualification, however, is that the risk must be reduced to the fullest extent possible while still maintaining the product's usefulness. See id.
3' See Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 400, 451 A.2d 179,
186 (1982); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 168, 406 A.2d
140, 149 (1979).
32 See, e.g., Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 410-11, 290 A.2d 281, 285
(1972) (liability imposed on manufacturer of machine for failure to install safety
device, even though custom of trade was for purchasers to install such devices).
33 See Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 449, 479 A.2d 374, 385
(1984); O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 180, 463 A.2d 298, 303 (1983);
Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 402, 451 A.2d 179, 187
(1982).
34 See Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 169, 406 A.2d 140,
149 (1979). The manufacturer will also be liable if the injured plaintiff was using
the product for a reasonably foreseeable purpose. Id.
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tion of the product after it leaves the manufacturer's control. 35
Several jurisdictions have held, however, that under certain circumstances, even substantial alteration of a product will not relieve the manufacturer of liability.3 6 For example, if the
manufacturer knows or anticipates that a change will be made
that will create a risk of injury to a potential user, the product is
considered to be defective. 7 In order to be relieved of liability,
the manufacturer must show that the alteration itself created the
defect that caused the injury and that the alteration was not reasonably foreseeable. 38 Although the New Jersey Supreme Court
had intimated prior to Soler and Brown that it would accept this
view of the law, 39 it had never before considered the issue in the
context of a design defect case.
III.

THE SOLER CASE

In Soler, New Jersey's highest court addressed for the first
time the question of a manufacturer's liability for injuries sustained by a foreseeable user of a product where the product was
substantially altered after leaving the manufacturer's control.4O
Manuel Soler, alleging a cause of action in strict liability, 4 1 sued
35 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1)(b) (1965); see also supra note

19 (setting forth text of § 402A).
36 See, e.g., Whitehead v. St. Joe Lead Co., 729 F.2d 238, 250 (3d Cir. 1984)
(interpreting NewJersey law); States S.S. Co. v. Stone Manganese Marine, Ltd., 371
F. Supp. 500, 505 (D.N.J. 1973); Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 196 Colo. 162, 172, 583
P.2d 276, 283 (1978); Sharp v. Chrysler Corp., 432 S.W.2d 131, 136 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1968). The Second Restatement of Torts takes no position on the liability of sellers for products that undergo substantial change, preferring to leave that to judicial
decisions. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment p (1965). The
drafters of the Restatement recognized, however, that substantial processing or alteration of a product would not excuse the seller from liability in all cases. See id.
37 See Whitehead v. St. Joe Lead Co., 729 F.2d 238, 250 (3d Cir. 1984). The
Whitehead court stated that a manufacturer may be held liable if it is "foreseeable
that the alteration will cause injury." Id.
38 See States S.S. Co. v. Stone Manganese Marine, Ltd., 371 F. Supp. 500, 505
(D.N.J. 1973). The manufacturer's liability will remain intact if the plaintiff can
prove that a pre-existing design defect, rather than the substantial change, actually
caused his injury. See Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 196 Colo. 162, 172, 583 P.2d 276,
283 (1978).
39 See Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 400, 451 A.2d 179,
186 (1982). The Michalko court stated that "[e]ven a significant subsequent alteration of a manufactured product will not relieve the manufacturer of liability unless
the change itself creates the defect that constitutes the proximate cause of the injury." Id.
40 See Soler, 98 N.J. at 141, 484 A.2d at 1227.
41 Id. Soler's complaint also alleged negligence and intentional wrongdoing on
the part of Castmaster. Id.
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the defendant for injuries he sustained while operating a die-casting machine.42 The operation of the machine consisted of two
cycles." 3 In the first cycle, two parts of a mold would close, forming a cavity, which would receive molten metal." 4 During the second cycle, the metal would cool and the mold would separate,
thus permitting the finished cast to be removed from the mold. 5
Under the machine's original design, the operator was required to start each cycle manually. 6 The first cycle was started
by pressing an electrical push button, which caused the mold to
close."7 The operator then initiated the second cycle by pressing
another button, which permitted the completed cast to fall from
the mold or, if the cast failed to drop from the machine, allowed
it to be removed by hand."8 As originally designed and manufactured by Castmaster, the machine lacked a safety gate or other
device to prevent the machine's moving parts from making contact with a worker's hand while the machine "was either in motion or capable of being set in motion.""9 Additionally, the
machine did not have an interlock, which would have cut off the
power if the operator's
hands were inside the machine removing
50
a jammed part.

Soler's employer changed the manual method of operation
by adding a trip wire to start each cycle automatically after the
machine was activated. 5 ' Upon completion of the second cycle,
the cast would fall from the mold and strike the trip wire, restarting the first cycle and allowing the die-caster to operate continuously. 52 The employer also installed a safety gate, which
would shut off power to the machine when opened, thus prevent53
ing the mold from opening or closing.
Soler was injured when he tried to free a finished cast that
had not fallen from the mold. 5" He testified at trial that when the
42 Id. at 142, 484 A.2d at 1227.
43 See id.
44 Id.
45 Id. The completed cast could either be removed by hand or permitted to fall
from the mold automatically. Id.
46 Id.
47 id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 142-43, 484 A.2d at 1228.
51 Id. at 143, 484 A.2d at 1228.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
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product jammed,55 he opened the safety gate,56 thereby stopping
the machine. When he reached into the machine and dislodged
machine started up again,58 trapping his
the part, 7 however, the
59
hand within the mold.

Although the machine had been altered by his employer,
Soler's expert witness testified that it was unsafe as originally
designed because of the absence of a safety gate or other device
to prevent the operator's hands from touching the machine's
moving parts.60 The expert also testified that the machine was
dangerous because it lacked a safety interlock to shut off power
to the machine. 6 ' He said that it was foreseeable that the
machine could start up accidentally, either in the manual mode
or in the automatic mode of operation. 62 According to the expert, these safety devices were available when the die-caster was
manufactured and could have been installed without impairing
the machine's utility or unduly increasing its CoSt. 6 3 Finally, the
expert concluded that even though the machine had been altered, " 'the original machine was still there.' ",64 This conclusion was supported by the testimony of Soler's supervisor that
the alterations had not changed the machine's function.65
Notwithstanding the expert's testimony, the trial court
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss Soler's claim.66 The
lower court ruled that the die-caster, as altered by the plaintiff's
employer, was "'an entirely different functional machine' " than
the one initially sold by Castmaster.67 Additionally, the court
held that there was no evidence that would permit a finding that
the machine, as originally designed, could be the proximate
55 See id. There was testimony that this kind ofjamming occurred frequently. See

id.

56 Id. Soler's supervisor testified that when he arrived at the machine moments
after the accident, Soler's arm was under the closed safety gate. Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. At the trial, the plaintiff failed to explain how the machine had restarted;
however, at his deposition, he indicated that the trip wire had reactivated the first
cycle when the jammed piece fell from the mold. Id.

59 Id.

Id.
See id. at 143-44, 484 A.2d at 1228.
See id. at 144, 484 A.2d at 1228. This was possible because a large surge of
electricity could conceivably override the push button and start the machine. Id.
The expert testified that an interlock would have removed this risk. Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 See id. at 141, 484 A.2d at 1227.
67 Id.
60
61
62
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cause of the accident.6 8
Soler subsequently appealed the trial court's judgment.6 9 In
reversing the lower court's decision, the appellate division ruled
that there were several unresolved factual issues: first, whether
there was a design defect in the original machine; second,
whether the changes made by the employer created an entirely
different machine; and third, whether the design defect was the
proximate cause of the injury.7 °
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted Castmaster's subsequent petition for certification. 7 ' The supreme court first inquired whether there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find
that the machine, as originally designed and while under the control of the manufacturer, was defective under the risk-utility standard.72 Justice Handler, writing for the court, noted that the
plaintiff's expert witness had testified that the die-casting
machine was designed without a safety gate and an interlock,
thus making it defective because it could accidentally start up
while the operator's hands were in contact with the machine's
moving parts. 73 In addition, the expert had also opined that
these safety devices were available at a reasonable cost at the
time of manufacture and would not have impaired the utility of
the machine.7 4 According to the court, this testimony was adequate under the risk-utility standard to allow the jury to decide
that the machine was defective as initially designed and while
under the manufacturer's control.75
Id. at 141-42, 484 A.2d at 1227.
69 See id. at 142, 484 A.2d at 1227.
70 Id. Additionally, the appellate division held that there was enough evidence
to warrant consideration of the claim of a design defect based on an inadequate
warning. Id. At trial, there was testimony that there were no "danger" warnings on
the machine at the time of the accident. Id. at 144, 484 A.2d at 1228. There was no
evidence, however, concerning the presence or absence of warnings when the
machine left the manufacturer's control. Id.; see also infra note 93 (absence of warnings would be considered on remand).
71 See Soler v. Castmaster, 93 N.J. 272, 460 A.2d 674 (1984).
72 Soler, 98 N.J. at 145-46, 484 A.2d at 1229. The court cited Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979). The Suter case requires an examination of the nature of the manufacturer's conduct and an
assessment of the feasibility of designing and producing the product in a way that
would have prevented the accident. See id. at 171-72, 406 A.2d at 150. The relevant inquiry is whether "the manufacturer act[ed] as a reasonably prudent person
by designing the item as he did and by placing it on the market in that condition."
Id. at 171, 406 A.2d at 150; see also supra note 29 (setting forth risk-utility factors).
73 Soler, 98 N.J. at 146, 484 A.2d at 1229.
74 Id., 484 A.2d at 1230.
75 Id. at 146-47, 484 A.2d at 1230.
68
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The court then addressed the issue of proximate cause,76
noting that the plaintiff must prove that the defect "proximately
caused the . . . injuries to a foreseeable user while the product
was being used for its intended or anticipated purposes." 7 7 Justice Handler refused to give a literal interpretation to section
402A(l)(b) of the Second Restatement of Torts,7" which imposes liability on a manufacturer only if the product "reach[es] the user
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold." 7 9
Instead, he held that a subsequent alteration of a product will not
relieve a manufacturer of liability if the change "is not substantial
in terms of the essential features of the product. '8' Furthermore, the court declared that for strict liability purposes, a
change is substantial only when it affects the product's safety.8 '
Justice Handler concluded that, under the facts of the Soler case,
it was for the jury to determine whether the machine had been
substantially altered in the strict liability sense.8 2
The court then reached the critical question of whether the
original design defect could constitute a proximate cause of the
injury despite a substantial, subsequent alteration of the
machine. 83 According to Justice Handler, a manufacturer may be
held liable despite a significant modification of the product if a
pre-existing design defect was "either the sole or a concurrent or
contributing proximate cause of the accident. ' 84 In the present
case, the court held that the jury could reasonably conclude that
the machine's original design had contributed to the accident;
thus, the manufacturer could be held accountable for the plaintiff's injuries even though the substantial change made by the
76 See id. at 147-52, 484 A.2d at 1230-33; see also supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (proximate cause is an essential element of strict products liability).
77 Soler, 98 N.J. at 147, 484 A.2d at 1230.
78 See supra note 19 (setting forth text of Restatement).
79 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(l)(b) (1965).
80 Soler, 98 N.J. at 147, 484 A.2d at 1230.
81 Id. at 148, 484 A.2d at 1230.
82 See id. at 148-49, 484 A.2d at 1231.
83 Id. at 149, 484 A.2d at 1231. The court noted that Finnegan v. Havir Mfg.
Corp., 60 N.J. 413, 290 A.2d 286 (1972) had "foreshadowed" this notion of proximate cause. Soler, 98 N.J. at 149, 484 A.2d at 1231. Finnegan held that the jury
should decide whether or not the replacement of a mechanical foot treadle on a
power punch press with an electrical pedal constituted a "substantial change" that
would relieve the manufacturer of liability. Finnegan, 60 N.J. at 423, 290 A.2d at
292. The Finnegan court also noted that the jury was free to conclude that the subsequent modification "had little or nothing to do with the happening of the accident," Id. at 424, 290 A.2d at 292.
84 Soler, 98 N.J. at 149, 484 A.2d at 1231.
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employer might also have contributed to the accident.8 5
The defendant argued that the jury could have found that
the employer's alteration was the sole cause of the accident.8 6 In
response to this, Justice Handler noted that the trial court had
apparently accepted this argument because it had held that the
original design defect was not the proximate cause of the accident.8 7 Nevertheless, the supreme court refused to accept the
defendant's contention that only those responsible for the alteration should be held liable.8 8 According to the court, this would
be an inappropriate application of the doctrine of foreseebility. 89
Relying on the Cepeda9 ° rule that a manufacturer is liable for injuries resulting from any misuse or abnormal use of its product that
is 'objectively foreseeable, ''91 the court extended this principle,
by analogy, to a foreseeable, substantial alteration of the prod92
Thus, the court concluded that a manufacturer can be liaUCt.
ble for injuries caused by a substantial alteration or misuse of its
product "if the alteration or misuse . . . was foreseeable and
could have been prevented or reduced by the manufacturer. ' '

IV.

THE BROWN CASE

The companion case to Soler, Brown v. United States Stove Co. ,
also raised the issue of a manufacturer's liability for a design defect when the product is substantially altered after leaving the
85 Id. at 150, 484 A.2d at 1231-32. The court quoted the following passage with
approval: " 'The jury could infer that because of the lack of a safety device the
accident would have occurred notwithstanding the change to an electrical foot
pedal. . . . At the most the alteration bears on the issue of proximate cause and
was a matter for the jury.' " Id. (quoting Finnegan v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 NJ. 413,
423-24, 290 A.2d 286, 292 (1972)).
86 Id. at 150-51, 484 A.2d at 1232.
87 Id. at 151, 484 A.2d at 1232.
88 See id.
89 Id.

90 Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978).
91 Id. at 177, 386 A.2d at 828.

Soler, 98 N.J. at 151, 484 A.2d at 1232.
Id. The court also noted Soler's claim that Castmaster had provided inadequate safety warnings. See id. at 152, 484 A.2d at 1233. AlthoughJustice Handler
ruled that this claim was properly dismissed because the plaintiff had introduced
evidence relating only to the absence of warnings at the time of the accident, he
observed that Soler should be given an opportunity upon retrial to prove that the
machine lacked proper warnings at the time of the initial sale by Castmaster. Id. at
153, 484 A.2d at 1233. The court directed that the adequacy of any warnings was
to be determined by the jury. See id.
94 98 NJ. 155, 484 A.2d 1234 (1984).
92

93
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manufacturer's control. 9 5 In so doing, Brown involved the consideration of two additional questions: first, whether the product
was defectively designed solely because it failed "to prevent or
avoid a subsequent substantial alteration or misuse that was foreseeable,"' 96 and second, "whether such a design 9defect
consti7
tutes a proximate cause of [a resulting] accident.
The plaintiff, Fred Brown, suffered extensive burns in a fire
caused by a free-standing, unvented space heater manufactured
by the United States Stove Company.9 8 Brown's employer used
the space heater to heat the garage of the salvage yard where
Brown worked.9 9 As originally designed and manufactured, the
heater included a thermocouple valve, a pilot-light tube, and an
automatic safety valve to prevent gas from entering the heater if
the pressure became too great. '0 Some fifteen years prior to the
accident, however, Brown's employer had altered the heater by
removing these safety devices so that the gas flow was
unregulated.' 0 '
The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, ruling
that the defendant had no duty to the plaintiff under strict liability principles. 0 2 It held that the subsequent alteration of the
product constituted " 'an absolute and total transformation of a
good, safe product into a completely unsafe product' " and that
such a transformation "was not reasonably foreseeble."'' 0 3 The
appellate division, however, reversed the trial court, holding that
there were factual issues for the jury to decide regarding the
foreseeability of the product's alteration. 0 4 The New Jersey
Supreme Court granted certification in 1983.105
According to the supreme court, the critical issues were "the
design of the heater and the foreseeability of its alteration or misuse."' 1 6 In regard to these issues, the plaintiff's expert witness
95

Id. at 161, 484 A.2d at 1237.

96 Id.

Id.
Id. at 162, 484 A.2d at 1237. The incident occurred when propane gas used
in the heater ignited and set fire to the plaintiff's clothing. Id., 484 A.2d at 123738.
99 See id., 484 A.2d at 1237.
100 Id.
101 Id. The unregulated gas pressure was approximately 100 times greater than
the heater's capacity as originally designed. Id.
102 Id. at 161, 484 A.2d at 1237.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 161-62, 484 A.2d at 1237.
105 See Brown v. United States Stove Co., 93 N.J. 256, 460 A.2d 663 (1983).
106 Brown, 98 N.J. at 162, 484 A.2d at 1238.
97
98
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testified that it was fair to assume that a certain percentage of
heaters of this type would be substantially altered.1 0 7 He also testified that it was common knowledge that these heaters were
often badly misused on construction sites.10 8 Because of this information, he maintained that the manufacturer could have reasonably foreseen that the safety features would be circumvented
and the heater operated at a pressure greater than that for which
it was designed. 0 9 Thus, according to the expert, the heater was
defective because "its design rendered it susceptible to the reasonably foreseeable alterations that were made." 110
The plaintiff's expert also testified about alternative designs
for the device in question."1 Noting that the heater's safety
mechanism was connected by an easily removable right-handed
threading, he stated that a possible alternative would have been
to use noncommercial left-handed threading or inverted flange
connectors, both of which were available at the time of manufacture.' 12 These changes would have made it much more difficult
13
to alter the heater and would not have impaired its usefulness."
On the other hand, the defendant's expert, an employee of
the United States Stove Company, testified that his search of the
company's files going back to the 1950's revealed no incidents of
alterations similar to those made on the heater in question.114
He also stated that the product was designed for residential use
rather than for use on a construction site.'
The defendant's expert further testified that right-handed threading was used because, unlike left-handed threading, "it was a standard
component that could be serviced . . . efficiently."" 6 Finally, he
maintained that an inverted flange would have required copper
tubing rather than the solid pipe actually used in the heater, and
107

Id. at 163, 484 A.2d at 1238.

108 Id. There was testimony that the heater in question had been used on con-

struction sites before being moved into the garage of Brown's employer. Id. at 163
n.1, 484 A.2d at 1238 n.1.
109 Id. at 163, 484 A.2d at 1238.
11O Id.

III See id. at 163-64, 484 A.2d at 1238.
Id. at 163, 484 A.2d at 1238.
113 See id. at 163-64, 484 A.2d at 1238.
114 Id. at 164, 484 A.2d at 1238.
115 Id., 484 A.2d at 1238-39. The defendant's expert also testified that a different
type of heater was available for use on construction sites. Id., 484 A.2d at 1238.
1 I Id., 484 A.2d at 1239. According to the defendant's expert, the use of components that were not commercially available would have resulted in higher service
costs to consumers, thus decreasing the product's utility. See id.
112
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he opined that this would have been impractical.' 17
As in Soler, the supreme court applied the risk-utility
formula" 8 to determine whether the product was defective as
originally designed.' 19 In the first part of his analysis, Justice
Handler, writing for a majority of the court, stated that the most
important factor in determining liability under the risk-utility
standard was foreseeability. 120 He stressed that foreseeability in
this context was to be measured by an objective standard, rather
than by actual knowledge of a product's danger. 12' The court
concluded that a manufacturer may be held liable for injuries
caused by its product where the design of a safety feature on the
item "foreseeably leads to a substantial alteration and an in22
creased risk of danger."1
As a result of his analysis of the foreseeability question, Justice Handler assigned little value to the testimony of the defendant's expert that there was nothing in the company's files to put it
on notice regarding alterations of its heaters.123 The court stated
that the defendant's evidence merely tended to show a lack of
actual knowledge, and therefore an absence of subjective foreseeability. 124 Thus, the court opined that the defendant had failed
to rebut the evidence introduced by the plaintiff that such alterations were commonplace. 1 2 5 This testimony, if believed, would

show that the alterations were objectively foreseeable. 126 Consequently, the supreme court concluded the first part of its analysis
by holding that the issue of the objective foreseeability of the
al127
jury.
the
by
decided
be
to
question
fact
a
created
terations
117 See id. at 164-65, 484 A.2d at 1239.
118 See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
119 Brown, 98 N.J. at 165, 484 A.2d at 1239.

Id. at 166, 484 A.2d at 1240.
Id. Cepeda held that misuse of a product could not insulate a manufacturer
from liability in a design defect case if the misuse was objectively foreseeable. See
Cepeda, 76 N.J. at 177, 386 A.2d at 828. Soler extended this notion to include an
objectively foreseeable, substantial alteration of the product when an injury results
from a pre-existing design defect. See Soler, 98 N.J. at 149, 484 A.2d at 1231. Misuse or substantial alteration of a product is objectively foreseeable when it could
reasonably have been anticipated at the time the product was designed and manufactured; however, there is no liability for theoretical or even just possibly foreseeable events. See Brown, 98 N.J. at 168, 484 A.2d at 1241.
122 Brown, 98 N.J. at 167, 484 A.2d at 1240; see also supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text (only a change that affects product's safety is substantial).
123 See Brown, 98 N.J. at 169, 484 A.2d at 1241-42.
124 Id., 484 A.2d at 1241.
125 See id. at 169-70, 484 A.2d at 1241-42.
126 See id.
127 See id., 484 A.2d at 1242.
120
121
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The court then addressed the second part of its analysis
under the risk-utility standard.' 28 According to Justice Handler,
a foreseeable risk did not automatically render a product defective; the risk must also outweigh the product's utility. 129 The

court noted that the defendant had introduced evidence that the
heater was useful and that the plaintiff's suggested alternatives
would have destroyed that utility.' 3 0 The majority further ob-

served that the plaintiff had failed to rebut this evidence.' 31 Nevertheless, Justice Handler stated that "the inferences to be drawn
from all of the evidence and the ultimate conclusion to be
reached

. . .

are disputable."' 13 2 Accordingly, the court held that

the question of whether the risks of the product outweighed its
utility, and therefore whether the product was defective
in de1 33
sign, was a matter to be determined by the jury.
This was not the end of the court's discussion, however. Justice Handler noted that there was another issue to be considered-the question of whether or not there was enough evidence
for the jury to find "that the design defect

. . .

was a proximate

injury."'' 3 4

cause of the ensuing
According to the majority, the
design defect could be a proximate cause of the injury even if it
was a concurrent or contributing factor along with the subsequent alteration of the product. 135 In other words, the design
defect must have remained operative despite the subsequent alteration, and it must have been a substantial factor in causing the
36

accident. 1

The court noted, however, that a factor is not necessarily
substantial merely because it contributes to the accident.

37

Jus-

tice Handler observed that an event cannot be considered a proximate cause if it is "too remotely or insignificantly related to the
accident."' 138 He stated that the concept of proximate cause limits liability to those causes that are closely connected to the re128
129
130
'3'
132

See id. at 170, 484 A.2d at 1242.
See id.

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 170-71, 484 A.2d at 1242.
Id. at 171, 484 A.2d at 1242.
135 Id. The concept of concurrent proximate cause has long been recognized in
New Jersey law. See, e.g., Johnson v. Salem Corp., 97 N.J. 78, 95, 477 A.2d 1246,
1255 (1984); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 203-04, 156 A.2d 1, 9 (1959);
Menth v. Breeze Corp., 4 N.J. 428, 441, 73 A.2d 183, 189 (1950).
136 Brown, 98 N.J. at 172, 484 A.2d at 1243.
133
'34

'37
138

Id.
Id.
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suiting harm.' 3 9 The majority opined that to hold otherwise
would be contrary to sound public policy and fairness. 40
In turning to the facts of the Brown case, the court noted that
there was no evidence to indicate that a proper design would
have made it impossible or "substantially difficult" to remove the
heater's safety devices.' 4 ' Rather, the appellate record indicated
that the heater had been willfully and intensively misused for approximately fifteen years.' 42 This led the court to infer that even
if the original design had been in accord with the suggestions
made by the plaintiff's expert, it would not have deterred the
subsequent abusers or prevented the accident.' 43 Consequently,
the court concluded that the subsequent alteration of the heater
had independently caused the accident.' 44 As a result, the court
reversed the appellate division's decision and held that the alleged design defect was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injuries. 115

In a concurring opinion, 146 Justice Schreiber disagreed with
the majority's view that the defendant manufacturer owed a duty
to the plaintiff. 4 7 He also criticized the majority's conclusion
that the jury should decide whether an act is reasonably or objectively foreseeable.' 48 Justice Schreiber maintained that almost
any act by a human being is foreseeable, including the removal of
safety equipment. 49 Therefore, he rejected the imposition of a0
duty based solely upon a jury's determination of foreseeability.15
Arguing that the majority's rationale was too "open-ended"
139 See id. at 173, 484 A.2d at 1243-44.
140 See id. The New Jersey Supreme Court has acknowledged that the doctrine of
proximate cause "is fundamentally . . . an instrument of fairness and policy."
Caputzal v. Lindsay Co., 48 N.J. 69, 77, 222 A.2d 513, 517 (1966). The principles
of proximate cause are applied "to draw judicial lines beyond which liability will not
be extended." Id.
141 Brown, 98 N.J. at 174, 484 A.2d at 1244.
142 See id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 174-75, 484 A.2d at 1244.
146 See id. at 175-85, 484 A.2d at 1245-50 (Schreiber, J., concurring). Justices
Clifford and Garibaldi joined injustice Schreiber's opinion. Id. at 185, 484 A.2d at
1250 (Schreiber, J., concurring).
147 See id. at 175, 484 A.2d at 1245 (Schreiber, J., concurring). The majority relied on the manufacturer's general duty to introduce only safe products into the
stream of commerce. Id. at 165, 484 A.2d at 1239.
148 See id. at 183, 484 A.2d at 1249 (Schreiber, J., concurring); see also supra notes
118-127 and accompanying text (setting forth majority's rationale and conclusion).
149 Brown, 98 N.J. at 183, 484 A.2d at 1249 (Schreiber, J., concurring).
150 See id.
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and that the use of a foreseeability approach did nothing to limit
liability, 5 ' Justice Schreiber advocated drawing a sharp line between the questions of duty and causation. 152 In focusing on the
question of duty, he would have the inquiry turn on principles of
fairness and equity. 153 Justice Schreiber declared that in the
present case, the ultimate question should involve the feasibility
of the plaintiff's proposed alternative of left-handed threading. 154 He stated that some of the factors for consideration by
the trial court in deciding this question should be the additional
cost consumers would have to pay, the adverse effect on servicing
the product, and the fact that the actual safety devices had
proven to be reasonably safe when the product was used for its
intended purpose.' 55
Additionally, Justice Schreiber considered the question of liability in cases where a safety device's "only alleged flaw is that it
can be removed."'' 56 In those instances where "such removal is
not required for the machine's operation and maintenance," he
would hold that the manufacturer has no liability.' 57 Justice
Schreiber also argued against strict liability in situations neither
intended nor within a manufacturer's reasonable anticipation. 15
He declared that this principle had been acknowledged in Suter v.
San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co. 159 but that the majority had ef160
fectively reversed it in the present case.
Justice Schreiber concluded his opinion with a discussion of
the proximate cause issue.' 6 1 He agreed with the majority that
the plaintiff had failed to prove that the proposed alternative design would have prevented the injury. 162 As a consequence, Justice Schreiber concurred with the majority in holding that the
151 Id.

Id. at 177, 484 A.2d at 1246 (Schreiber, J., concurring).
Id. at 179, 484 A.2d at 1247 (Schreiber, J., concurring).
154 Id.
155 Id. at 179-80, 484 A.2d at 1247 (Schreiber, J., concurring).
156 Id. at 180, 484 A.2d at 1247 (Schreiber, J., concurring).
157 Id. Justice Schreiber cited numerous cases from other jurisdictions holding
that removal of safety devices relieves the manufacturer of liability. See id. at 18082, 484 A.2d at 1247-48 (Schreiber, J., concurring). As an exception, he would
hold that a manufacturer does have a duty to affix safety devices that cannot be
removed by a child. Id. at 180, 484 A.2d at 1247 (Schreiber, J., concurring).
158 See id.at 182-83, 484 A.2d at 1249 (Schreiber, J., concurring).
159 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979). The Suter court noted "that an unforeseeable misuse of a product may not give rise to strict liability." Id. at 159, 406 A.2d at
144.
160 Brown, 98 N.J. at 183, 484 A.2d at 1249 (Schreiber, J., concurring).
161 See id. at 184-85, 484 A.2d at 1249-50 (Schreiber, J., concurring).
162 Id. at 184, 484 A.2d at 1250 (Schreiber, J., concurring).
152
153
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plaintiff had3 failed to meet his burden of proof on the issue of
causation.16
V.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

Both Soler and Brown were concerned with the liability of a
manufacturer whose product had been substantially altered by a
user or consumer. Although the manufacturer in Soler was found
liable while the manufacturer in Brown was not, the logic used by
the supreme court was consistent. In both cases, the court refused to accept the Restatement,'" which relieves a manufacturer
of liability if the product has been substantially altered after it has
been sold. 165 Instead, the court held that a manufacturer may be
held liable if a subsequent alteration "was foreseeable and could
have been prevented or reduced by the manufacturer." 166 In
those cases where there is more than one cause of the accident,
liability may still be found if "the original design defect. . [was]
167
a concurrent or contributing proximate cause of the accident."'
Brown simply clarifies Soler by indicating the limits to be placed on
the concept of proximate cause. According to the court, a faulty
act cannot constitute a cause of the accident if it is "too remotely
or insignificantly related to the accident."' 68
Although Justice Schreiber concurred in the result in
Brown, 169 his opinion contrasted sharply with that of the majority.
In Brown, the majority rejected the imposition of liability on the
manufacturer on the ground that there was insufficient causal
connection. 17 In doing so, the court declared that the analysis
of proximate cause was the appropriate means for limiting liability when it serves "fairness and sound public policy" to do so.''
Justice Schreiber, however, took a narrower view. While he
agreed with the majority that there was an insufficient causal connection in Brown,' 7 2 he would have held that, as a matter of law, a
manufacturer should not be liable when adequate safety equip163 Id. at 185, 484 A.2d at 1250 (Schreiber, J., concurring).
164 See Soler, 98 N.J. at 147, 484 A.2d at 1230; Brown, 98 N.J. at 165-66, 484 A.2d
at 1239.
165 See supra note 19 (quoting the appropriate section of the Restatement).
166 Soler, 98 N.J. at 151, 484 A.2d at 1232; see also Brown, 98 N.J. at 168-69, 484
A.2d at 1241 (quoting this language from Soler).
167

Soler, 98 N.J. at 149, 484 A.2d at 1231.

168
169
170
171
172

Brown, 98 N.J. at 172, 484 A.2d at 1243.
See id. at 175-85, 484 A.2d at 1245-50 (Schreiber, J., concurring).
Id. at 174-75, 484 A.2d at 1244.
Id. at 173, 484 A.2d at 1243.
See id. at 184-85, 484 A.2d at 1249-50 (Schreiber, J., concurring).
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ment is removed and the product is used in a way beyond his
reasonable anticipation.

73

Therefore, under the facts of Brown,

Justice Schreiber would have held that the manufacturer owed no
duty to the injured worker. 174 In contrast, the Brown majority
held that if a subsequent alteration of the product is foreseeable,
it becomes a jury question as to whether or not the manufacturer
had a duty to guard against such a change.175 Therefore, one

difference between the Brown majority and Justice Schreiber lay
in their views of a manufacturer's duty. The majority rejected the
limitations indicated by the Restatement in favor of those provided
by the concept of foreseeability. Justice Schreiber, on the other
hand, noting that "[t]he removal of a safety device is always objectively foreseeable," 176 would have upheld the Restatement
rule. '77

Underlying this distinction is another, more fundamental
disagreement. Both the majority and the concurrence appeal to
notions of fairness. It seems the difference between the Brown
majority and Justice Schreiber can be expressed in a practical way
as one of degree-because of their differing views of the manufacturer's duty, the majority would find more instances in which
it would be "fair" to impose liability than would Justice Schreiber. The majority's decisions in Soler and Brown are expansive,
continuing to enlarge the scope of strict products liability,
whereas Justice Schreiber would draw a line beyond which a
manufacturer would no longer be liable.
Probably one of the unspoken reasons for allowing the imposition of liability in a case such as Soler is that the plaintiff is
usually prohibited by state workers' compensation statutes from
suing the real wrongdoer 7S-the employer 79 who has taken a
173 See id. at 178-79, 182, 484 A.2d at 1247, 1249 (Schreiber, J., concurring).
174 Id. at 175, 484 A.2d at 1245 (Schreiber, J., concurring).
175 See id. at 169, 484 A.2d at 1241.
176

Id. at 183, 484 A.2d at 1249 (Schreiber,J., concurring).

177 See id. at 178-79, 484 A.2d at 1246-47 (Schreiber, J., concurring).

It is thus
difficult to understand why Justice Schreiber joined the majority in Soler, which relied on the foreseeability of the substantial alteration of the product by an ultimate
user. See Soler, 98 N.J. at 151, 484 A.2d at 1232.
178 For example, the relevant New Jersey statute prevents any other cause of action. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-8 (West Cum.Supp. 1985-1986).
179 Of course, employers (and proponents of workers' compensation laws) argue
that the statutes are a tradeoff. In return for a statutory limitation on an employer's
liability for employee injuries, the employee gains an unfettered right to recover for
such injuries. This argument begs the question, however. A tradeoff is certainly
appropriate for injuries caused by accidents where there is no deliberate culpability
by the employer, but where the employer has altered the basic safety features of a
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relatively safe product and substantially altered it by removing its
safety devices.' 8 0 Because the workers' compensation statutes
provide limited awards,'"' the only way that an injured worker
can recover adequately in many cases is by suing the manufacturer-a remedy that the Soler court permits by its expansive approach to a manufacturer's liability. This, of course, is a classic
"deep-pocket" approach.
It is not the most equitable approach, however. If liability
should be imposed in accordance with fairness, then the employee should not be limited to suing the manufacturer of the
product, nor should the employer be shielded from liability by
statute. 18 2 By contrast, in cases where consumers or users are
injured in a nonindustrial setting, the plaintiff can sue anyone in
the commercial chain who has increased the product's danger by
substantially altering it. The same rule should apply in the industrial context. Workers' compensation statutes, which were progressive at a time when actions arising from job-related accidents
were often denied on grounds of contributory negligence, are
now regressive in that they often insulate the true wrongdoer
from liability. The public policies of providing an adequate remedy to the injured party and allocating liability in accordance with
product, the societal goal of placing blame on the one who caused the injury is
defeated.
180 For example, the trial judge in Soler described the alteration made by
Castmaster as creating" 'an entirely different functional machine.' " Soler, 98 N.J. at
141, 484 A.2d at 1227.
181 For example, compensation for pain and suffering is not permitted under
workers' compensation statutes. See A. LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAw:
CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT § 69.10, at 519 (1984).
182 The manufacturer in a products liability suit is also prohibited from introducing evidence that the employer was contributorily negligent. Jarrett v. Duncan
Thecker Assocs., 175 NJ. Super. 109, 417 A.2d 1064 (Law Div. 1980). This result
follows from NewJersey's comparative negligence statute, which requires an allocation of liability, equaling 100%, among only the parties named in a suit. See N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.2(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1985-1986). State workers' compensation law also provides that an injured worker may not file a personal injury suit
against his employer. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. Therefore, because the employer cannot be named in a products liability action, evidence of his
negligence may not be considered by the trier of fact. SeeJarrett, 175 N.J. Super. at
114-15, 417 A.2d at 1067. Additionally, an employee's contributory negligence is
not a defense available to a manufacturer when sued by an individual who used the
product in an industrial setting. Green v. Sterling Extruder Corp., 95 N.J. 263,
271-72, 471 A.2d 15, 20 (1984); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J.
150, 177, 406 A.2d 140, 153 (1979). Thus, by statute and common law, the manufacturer is the only party against whom ajury may impose liability, even though it is
clear that both the employer and the employee may also be at fault.
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fault can best be served by allowing the jury to assess a percentage of liability against each party that contributes to the accident.
Without such an allocation of liability, too great a burden is
placed upon the manufacturer. This creates problems that extend beyond the question of unfairness to an individual manufacturer in a particular case. In his concurrence in Brown, Justice
Schreiber mentioned some of these difficulties, such as the increased cost of products to the public. 18 3 Another problem has
been suggested by Dean William Crowe, 184 who maintains that
there is a tension between society's desire to provide compensation to victims injured by products and our economic system.185
According to Dean Crowe, our system encourages businesses to
be productive and creative by bringing new products to the market.' 86 Thus, any imposition of liability on manufacturers for
harm caused by a product will not only add to the cost of products, but will also have a "chilling effect" on creativity and
productivity.18 7
These and other problems in the field of products liability
have been widely discussed in recent years. One important response has been the introduction of a bill in Congress to establish a uniform products liability law.' 88 This proposed
legislation, to be known as the "Product Liability Act,"' 89 would
pre-empt all state law regarding products liability 90 in order to
define more clearly the obligations of manufacturers.
Under the Act, a manufacturer would be liable if the product
183 See Brown, 98 N.J. at 179-80, 484 A.2d at 1247 (Schreiber, J., concurring).
Costs resulting from potential products liability may become so high that a manufacturer cannot afford to stay in business. Mr. James Winker, vice president of
Raven Industries, a manufacturer of hot-air sport balloons, testified before Congress that his company may be forced to abandon that product line. Product Liability
Act: Hearingon S. 100 Before the Subcomm. on the consumer of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1985) (statement ofJames
Winker, Vice President, Raven Industries). He stated that in the late 1970's, liability insurance for this line was $100,000 per year, 4% of the product's cost. Id. at
41. By 1985, the insurance premium had risen to $750,000, 31% of the product's
cost. Id.
184 Crowe, Products Liability Law--A Brief Reflection on Legal Analysis and an Aspect of
the Concept of Defect, 34 MERCER L. REV. 955 (1983).
185 Id. at 956.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 S. 100, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Products
Liability Act].
189 Id. § 1.
190 Id. § 3(b)(1).
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was unreasonably dangerous in manufacture' 9 or design,192 if
the manufacturer failed to give adequate instruction or warnings, 9 3 or if the product did not meet its express warranty. 194
Further, under the Act, the unreasonably dangerous aspect of the
product must have been the proximate cause of the injury in order for the plaintiff to recover.' 95 This standard would be consis19 6
tent with current New Jersey law.
The Act also adopts comparative negligence principles

97

for

allocating liability to the various parties in a suit. Misuse' 98 and
alteration' 99 -measured by an objective standard 2°0 -are to be
considered by the jury in making this allocation, except where
the misuse or alteration was by the plaintiff's employer or fellow
employee. 20 ' Thus, if Soler and Brown were considered under the
Act, the result would be the same as under New Jersey law, but
only because the accidents happened in a work setting-in each
case, the plaintiff's employer had altered the product in question.
The rules that come from Soler and Brown, allowing liability when
a product has been altered after leaving the manufacturer's control, and from Cepeda, allowing liability after a product has been
misused, would be pre-empted by the Act whenever the injury
occurred in a nonwork setting.
The Act is an attempt to provide a national legislative answer
to at least some of the perceived problems in the field of products liability. While it does not address the problems and inconsistencies caused by workers' compensation statutes,2 °2 it does
seek to limit the liability of manufacturers in other areas. Most
191 Id. § 4(I)(A).
192

Id.

§ 4(1)(B).

193 Id. § 4(1)(C).
194 Id. § 4(1)(D).
195 Id. § 4(2).
196 See supra note 31 and accompanying
197 See Proposed Products Liability Act,
198

text.
supra note 188, § 9(a).

Id. § 9(c).

199 Id. § 9(d)(1).
200 See id. § 9(c), (d)(l). The Act specifically provides that "[a]lteration or modification [of the product] shall be considered to occur when a product is changed in a
manner which is not consistent with the reasonably anticipated conduct of users." Id.
§ 9(d)(l) (emphasis added).
201 Id. § 9(c),(d)(l).
202 The Act defers to state laws that prohibit an employee "from recovering in
any action other than a workers' compensation claim against a present or former
employer." Id. § 10(d). This perpetuates the inequity of allowing an employer who
has negligently or intentionally altered a product to escape from any liability beyond that provided by state workers' compensation law. See supra notes 178-182
and accompanying text; see also Proposed Products Liability Act, supra note 188,
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importantly, it seeks to provide clear guidelines at a time when
manufacturers are more uncertain than ever of their potential liability. While it is too soon to predict whether this or similar legislation will be passed by Congress,2 °3 the impetus behind it will
remain strong as long as state courts continue to follow an expansive and "open-ended" approach to liability. Whatever the
merits of the particular holdings in Soler and Brown, the New
Jersey Supreme Court, by allowing liability for manufacturers to
turn on vague standards such as foreseeability and proximate
cause, has missed an opportunity to set clear guidelines and has
made the need for a legislative response more imperative.
James R. Icklan
§ 9(b)(l)(B) (trier of fact may assess comparative liability of all nonparties except
plaintiff's employer and fellow employees).
203 The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation has rejected S. 100, the proposed Product Liability Act. See Wolf, FederalStandard: Product
Liability Rule Rejected, 71 A.B.A.J., Aug. 1985, at 19. Despite this rejection, there still
seems to be a strong feeling in Congress that national legislation is necessary to
alleviate the high cost of products liability insurance. See Sony, Your Policy Is Canceled, supra note 3, at 25-26.

